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LIV Golf had $300 million and still collapsed: 4 lessons from last week in sports business

Writer: CUBOPRO Team
CUBOPRO Team
Nov 10
9 min read

Covering the sports business news of 2 to 8 November 2026


Last week, LIV Golf moved to liquidation. Less than a day after BC Partners Credit walked away from up to $300 million of rescue financing, the league's lawyers told a US bankruptcy court it would wind down after five years.


Our central argument: a backer can launch a league, but only a business model keeps it alive. LIV had money for five years and still never built revenue, ownership or a product that could stand without its funder. The same week, the Premier Jumping League kept preparing a 2027 launch with the same headline number, $300 million, but a different structure. The comparison shows every organization what to test before it backs, joins or builds a new format.


Also in this edition


  • Finn Harps: a fan-owned Irish club voted 99% to hand control to a private investor. What members should secure before they say yes.


  • Gotham FC: a $100 million raise at a reported $350 million valuation, on about $11 million of revenue. What investors are really paying for in women's sport.


  • Ligue 1: the French league reopened its domestic TV rights two years early. Why owning a direct-to-fan platform strengthens a rights negotiation.


Lead story: a backer can launch a league, but only a business model keeps it alive


The lesson: before you back, join or build a new format, test whether it can survive without the money that started it.


What happened


Last week, it was reported that BC Partners Credit had dropped its plan to finance a relaunched "LIV 2.0" with up to $300 million. The next day, LIV's lawyers told a bankruptcy court in New Jersey that the league would move from a restructuring plan to a liquidation.

LIV filed for bankruptcy protection in September, after the PIF, its majority shareholder, withdrew its backing. The rescue plan was a smaller 2027 tour, majority-owned by its players, with BC Partners as minority investor. It depended on signing a minimum number of players. BC Partners set a 25 October deadline for those commitments, later extended to 1 November. More than 30 players were reportedly interested, but the league did not secure contracts with its biggest names, and BC Partners concluded it had run out of time.


Not disclosed: what happens to LIV's players, broadcasters, employees and commercial partners, and what its remaining assets are worth.


What we think it means


LIV never had a business problem it could fix with more time. It had one customer, its funder. For five years, prize money, player contracts and events were paid by the PIF, so the league never had to prove that fans, broadcasters and sponsors would pay for the product. When the funder left, there was nothing underneath.


The rescue plan exposed a second weakness. LIV's product was a group of star players, and LIV did not control that product. Each star could walk away, and several did. A league whose value sits in a few contracts that can leave is not an asset an investor can price.


The Premier Jumping League (PJL) is a useful contrast. It is still a single-backer project: McCourt Global, Frank McCourt's group, which also owns Olympique de Marseille, guarantees its $300 million prize pot. But its structure differs on the points where LIV failed. It received approval from the sport's international federation, the FEI, and says its fixtures will not interfere with riders' other events. It sold its first team for $50 million in June, bringing in owners beyond the founder. And it plans to sell sponsorship and broadcasting centrally: in May it began a tender for the production company that will make its international TV signal, ahead of its first season in 2027. None of this guarantees success. It does mean the PJL is trying to build revenue and owners that do not depend on one person.


A practical framework: four tests for any new format


  1. The funder test. If the main backer stopped paying tomorrow, which revenue would remain? If the answer is none, you are looking at a project, not a business.


  2. The product test. Does the organization control what it sells (teams, rights, a calendar), or does it rent it from athletes who can leave?


  3. The system test. Does the format work with the governing body and the existing calendar, or does it need to win a fight first?


  4. The ownership test. How many owners have their own money at risk? Spread ownership brings more capital, more networks and more discipline.


What it means for your organization

Size

What to do

Small (amateur and semi-pro)

If one sponsor, owner or grant pays most of the bills, write down what you would cut if it stopped. Then start building one revenue line that does not depend on that source.

Mid-sized

Before joining a new competition, cup or tour, ask its organizers the four tests above in writing. Their answers are part of your risk assessment.

Large

If you launch a new format or event, make sure the IP, the calendar and the broadcast rights sit with you, not with the talent or a single partner.


Finn Harps: when members hand over control, the terms matter more than the cheque


The lesson: a member-owned club can take private money without giving up everything, but only if it negotiates its protections before the vote.


What happened


Last week, members of the Finn Harps Co-Operative Society voted 99% in favour of a takeover by Freddy Gonzalez, a 48-year-old former Philippines international whose family has business interests in Asia. It was the second and final vote, after a first approval in October. Gonzalez has pledged an initial investment of about €4 million, reported elsewhere as more than €3.6 million over three years. He will take control of the club's business, assets, players and commercial operations once the club licence moves to his company, and the club becomes debt free. Finn Harps finished bottom of Ireland's First Division this season. The board expects to complete the deal in the coming weeks.

Not disclosed: what the members keep after the transfer, such as rights over the name, the colours or the ground, and what happens if the investment is not delivered.


Our view


For a struggling club, the choice was realistic: stay member-owned and keep losing ground, or bring in an owner with capital. The weak point in most of these deals is not the decision to sell. It is how little the members ask for in return. A pledge spread over three years is a promise, not a payment. Members who give up control should secure a few protections that cost the investor little: a veto over moving or renaming the club, commitments linked to the pledged investment, and the right to buy the club back if the owner leaves.


What it means for your organization

Size

What to do

Small (amateur and semi-pro)

Decide now which things members must never lose (name, colours, ground, community role). Write them into the statutes before any investor arrives.

Mid-sized

Link any pledged investment to dates and amounts in the contract, with consequences if it is not paid.

Large

For minority or fan shareholders, a "golden share" over identity decisions is a low-cost way to keep trust during an ownership change.


Gotham FC: investors pay for market position and infrastructure, not this year's revenue


The lesson: a club's value rests on the assets that will produce future revenue (its market, its stadium, its fan base), so build and present those assets, not only last season's accounts.


What happened


Last week, Gotham FC, the NWSL club from the New York area, announced a $100 million capital raise led by the Moelis family. It brings in seven new minority investors, the first since Carolyn Tisch Blodgett took control in 2023. The round reportedly values the club at $350 million, 84% above an April estimate of $190 million and above the $340 million Forbes gave Angel City FC, then the highest-valued club in its NWSL rankings. Gotham's 2025 revenue was estimated at only $11 million, against $38 million each for Angel City and the Kansas City Current. The money will fund the squad, a new training facility in New Jersey and the 2028 move to Etihad Park in New York.


Not disclosed: the valuation itself (the club announced only the size of the raise), the stakes each investor bought and the club's actual revenue.


Our view


A valuation of about 32 times estimated revenue only makes sense if investors are buying the future. They are paying for three things: the New York market, a stadium move that should multiply matchday and hospitality revenue, and a place in a league where the price of entry keeps rising (new teams in Columbus and Atlanta cost $205 million and $165 million). The gap with Kansas City is telling. The Current, who opened their own stadium in 2024, already earn more than three times as much, and Gotham's investors are betting on a similar jump at Etihad Park. For any women's team, the message is that the story of what you will become, backed by concrete assets, is what attracts capital.


What it means for your organization

Size

What to do

Small (amateur and semi-pro)

Treat your women's team as a separate asset with its own audience and sponsors, not as a cost line inside the men's club.

Mid-sized

Prepare an investor case built on the assets that will grow revenue: venue plans, local market size, fan data.

Large

If you own a women's team, measure its value separately; minority stakes in it can fund growth without diluting the main club.


Ligue 1: owning a direct-to-fan platform gives you options in a rights negotiation


The lesson: a league or club that runs its own channel to fans can sell rights from a stronger position, because it can offer a partner either the content or the platform.


What happened


Last week, the LFP opened a tender for the domestic audiovisual rights to every Ligue 1 match from 2027/28 to 2031/32, sold as a single package. Bidders have two options: buy the rights and broadcast the matches themselves, or become the exclusive distributor of Ligue 1+, the league's own streaming service. Bids are due by 3 December. The league is returning to the market two years earlier than planned. Ligue 1+ was launched in August 2025 after DAZN ended its deal early, and now has an estimated 1.1 million subscribers. More broadly, French football's rights market has been unstable since Mediapro's deal of about €1 billion a year collapsed in 2020. One French rights consultant described the early tender as an admission that Ligue 1+ is not working as hoped.


Not disclosed: the price the LFP is seeking, and Ligue 1+'s revenue.


Our view


The critics may be right that Ligue 1+ has not met its targets. But building it changed the league's position. In 2024, under pressure with the season about to start, the LFP accepted a deal at about half the price it had sought. Now it has an alternative: if bids disappoint, it can keep running its own service. The league's president made the same point last week, saying Ligue 1+ had given the league back its freedom of choice. That fallback is what gives a seller leverage. The second option, a partner distributing the league's platform, is also a model worth watching: the league keeps the product and the data, and the partner brings reach and subscribers.


What it means for your organization

Size

What to do

Small (amateur and semi-pro)

Own your fan contacts. A mailing list, a membership base or your own streams of youth and women's matches are assets no partner can take away.

Mid-sized

Before selling media or streaming rights, know your fallback: what you would earn by producing and distributing yourself.

Large

Consider offering partners distribution of your platform rather than only the rights, so you keep the customer data and the relationship.


The bigger picture


Capital is still flowing into sport, but last week showed that it follows structure. Gotham FC raised $100 million on the strength of its market, its stadium plan and its league position. Finn Harps found an owner because its members were willing to change how the club is controlled. The Premier Jumping League sold its first team and secured federation approval before staging a single event. LIV Golf, with far more money than any of them, collapsed because it never built a structure that could carry the business without its funder.


For directors and owners, the question is not only "how much money can we raise?" It is "what structure will that money build, and will it still stand if the money stops?"


Four questions for directors and owners


  1. If your largest funder (owner, sponsor or public body) stopped paying tomorrow, which revenue would remain?


  2. Which of your assets would an investor pay for today, and which have you not yet developed?


  3. If you gave up control to an investor, which protections would your members or shareholders need in writing?


  4. Do you own a direct channel to your fans, or does a partner own that relationship?


Put your model through the four tests


Are you launching a new event, joining a new competition, or relying on one main funder?


We can run the four tests from this week's lead story on your organization and show you where the model is exposed and what to build first.


Book a call with the CUBOPRO team.



Sources


LIV Golf: Axios, Insider Sport, Daily Maverick / Reuters, Sportcal, GOLF.com, Golf Digest, News Tribune


Premier Jumping League: Business Wire, Horse & Hound, Chronicle of the Horse, Sportcal


Finn Harps: Highland Radio, Daily Tribune, Irish Examiner


Gotham FC: Forbes, Football Business News, 2Playbook


Ligue 1: Advanced Television, Inside World Football, Flashscore, Sud Radio, Sportcal

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